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THE FUTURE OF CONFRONTATION 
Peter Westen* 
The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-
awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten 
years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans1 to reconcile 
the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional com-
mands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string 
of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without appar-
ent difficulty.2 Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in 
the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional prob-
lems of hearsay once and for all.3 Instead, after oral argument in 
1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found itself hopelessly 
divided, able to produce only an inconclusive plurality opinion.4 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. ·1964, Hlln'.ard University; J.D. 
1968, University of California, Berkeley.-Ed. 
1. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
2. The line of cases began in 1965 with the decision in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 
(1965), holding the confrontation clause applicable to the states through the fourteenth 
amendment, and ended in 1970 with California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
3. Shortly after granting certiorari in Dutton, the Court in California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149 (1970), emphasized that it had no occasion "in the present case" to formulate a 
general theory of confrontation: 
0
"We have no occasion in the present case to map out a 
theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine the validity of all such hearsay 
'exceptions' permitting the introduction of an absent declarant's statements.".399 U.S. 
at 162. In emphasizing that Green was not the proper "occasion" in which "to map out a 
[general] theory," the Court may have had Dutton in mind, because it had already heard 
original argument in Dutton and set the case for reargument the following Term. Indeed, 
Justice Harlan made a special point of suggesting in Green that the then-pending Dutton 
case would be an "appropriat[e]" setting to consider the "broad problem" of the relation-
ship between hearsay and confrontation. 399 U.S. at 172 n.2 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
4. Dutton produced four separate opinions. Justice Stewart, vqiting for himself and 
three others, wrote a plurality opinion; Justice Harlan and Justice Blackmun wrote sepa-
rate concurring opinions; and Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion for himself and 
three others. As Erwin Griswold put it, "[I]t may fairly be said that although the result 
[in Dutton] was 5 to 4, the decision was about 4.6 to 4.4." Griswold, The Due Process 
Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 724 (1971). 
The plurality opinion in Dutton has been roundly criticized, in no small part because 
it did not provide the kind of "clear and consistent guidelines" that commentators believe 
are needed. Note, The Confrontation Test for Hearsay Exceptions: An Uncertain 
Standard, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 580, 596 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Uncertain Standard]. 
In addition, see Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process, 
6 CONN. L. REV. 529, 532, 548, 552, 556 (1974); Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and 
the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 1378, 1382 (1972); Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and 
the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEXAS L. REV. 151, 187-89 (1978) (plurality opinion is "excep-
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Since then, the Court has conspicuously avoided this central 
problem of the relationship between hearsay and confrontation. 6 
For the first time in nearly a decade, the Court appears ready 
to consider the problem again, in Ohio v. Roberts.6 Roberts comes 
to the Court at a propitious time: four of the Justices - nearly a 
working majority - have not yet committed themselves to partic-
ular theories of confro:ptation, thus enabling the Court to make a 
relatively fresh start.7 Roberts also comes to the Court in a propi-
tionally unclear" and provides "inadequate guidance") [hereinafter cited as Forgetful 
Witness]; Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh 
Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 122-23 (1972); Liacos, The Right of Confronta-
tion and the Hearsay Rule: Another Look, 34 AM. TRIAL LAw. J. 153, 160-66 (1972); 
Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 RUT.-CAM. 
L. REv. 43, 49-52, 63-73 (1975); Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1972) ("after Dutton v. Evans •.• the meaning of the confrontation 
clause is no longer clear"); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 76, 81-85 (1971); Note, Hearsay and the Confrontation Guaranty, 38 
LA. L. REv. 858, 862 (1978) ("Dutton raised more questions than it answered") [herein-
after cited as Confrontation Guaranty]; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. 
REv. 38, 188, 191 (1971); Comment, The Uncertain Relationship Between the Hearsay 
Rule and the Confrontation Clause, 52 TExAS L. REV. 1167, 1171 (1974). 
5. The Court has decided a number of confrontation cases since Dutton, but none of 
them presented central problems of hearsay. Some cases, though decided under the rubric 
of confrontation, were not actually confrontation cases at all. See, e.g., Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), discussed in Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory 
Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 605-13 
(1978). Some were confrontation cases not involving hearsay. See, e.g., Anderson v. United 
States, 417 U.S. 211, 218-21 (1974); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). Some, though 
involving hearsay, were essentially harmless-error cases. See, e.g., Parker v. Randolph, 99 
S. Ct. 2132 (1979); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1973); Schneble v. 
Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972). Some were hearsay cases that could easily be decided under 
precedent. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). 
Furthermore, the Court has denied certiorari in a number of cases that raise central 
questions about the relationship between hearsay and confrontation. See, e.g., United 
States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977); United 
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Park 
v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1974), revd. en bane, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 824 (1975); United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
876 (1974); Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); 
and cases cited in Comment, supra note 4, at 1176 n.52, 1177 n.66, 1187 n.101, 1189 n.107-
08, 1190 n.116, 1192 n.123. For criticism of such denials of certiorari, see Brown Transp. 
Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014, 1019-20 (1978) (White & Blackmun, J.J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari); McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936, 939 (1978) (Stewart 
& Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
6. 55 Ohio St. 2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1990 (1979) (No. 
78-756). 
7. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined the Court after Dutton was de-
cided. Justice Blackmun was on the Court at the time California v. Green and Dutton 
were decided; but he did not participate in Green, and he wrote a separate concurring 
opinion in Dutton based not exclusively on a theory of confrontation, but also on a finding 
of harmless error. 
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tious form: the facti, of the case dramatize the usefulness and 
beauty of a solution to the hearsay problem that Justice Harlan 
proposed in his concurring opinion in California v. Green.8 Al-
though Justice Harlan later repudiated his "ingenious"9 proposal, 
there is good reason to believe that he was right the first time, 
and that the future of confrontation lies in the direction he 
pointed. 
I. JUSTICE HARLAN'S THEORY 
The beauty of Justice Harlan's solution can best be appre-
ciated by reference to ~he problem it addresses. The problem is 
to define the relationship between hearsay exceptions, which 
allow the prosecution to introduce incriminating out-of-court 
statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted and the right 
of confrontation, which entitles a defendant to be "confronted 
with the witnesses against him."10 All previous solutions had been 
unsatisfactory, finding no tenable "middle ground"" between the 
8. 399 U.S. 149, 172-89 (1970). Justice Harlan himself believed that the central prob-
lems of hearsay are best examined in a case like Roberts, where the declarant is not 
available to testify in person. See 399 U.S. at 172 n.2. 
9. Read, supra note 4, at 43. 
10. U.S. CONST., amend. VI. 
11. Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, a Peek Forward, 1 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 32, 40 (1973). It was hoped that Dutton would provide such a standard, 
but it is generally conceded that the plurality opinion "sets out no standards to test the 
constitutionality of a hearsay exception." United States v. Clayton, 450 F.2d 16, 20 (1st 
Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). In addition, see Uncertain Standard, supra note 4, at 595 
("the plurality opinion in Evans utterly fails to explain the standard by which it decides 
to uphold the constitutionality of the evidence rule there at issue"); Dutton v. Evans, 400 
U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
Some venturesome commentators have tried to fill the void by articulating a standard 
of reliability that falls somewhere between the extremes of either admitting or excluding 
all hearsay statements. Unfortunately, except for those commentators who essentially 
adopt Justice Harlan's view, see note 72 infra, those proposed standards ofreliability turn 
out to be either illusory or idiosyncratic. Thus, Davenport suggests that hearsay state-
ments are admissible if (and only if) they possess such "indicia of reliability" as to be 
substantially equivalent in reliability to a cross-examined statement. Davenport, supra 
note 4, at 1390. Yet he either ignores the obvious fact that every hearsay statement is "at 
best a partial substitute for cross-examination," Comment, Confrontation and the Hear-
say Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1436 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearsay Rule]; or he 
believes that only substantial equivalence in reliability is required, without explaining, 
however, why a substantial equivalence should be sufficient pr how one goes about mea-
suring it. In contrast, Natali takes the 18 words of the confrontation clause and restates 
them as a 241-word, two-page statement of how he, personally, would codify the jurisprud-
ence of confrontation. Natali, supra note 4, at 62-63. 
The most interesting and original solution for resolving the "dilemma" is Professor 
Kenneth Graham's. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir 
Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, B CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972). Graham's proposal de-
1188 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1185 
"extreme[s]"12 of either allowing every hearsay statement to be 
admitted13 or requiring every hearsay statement to be excluded. u 
Justice Harlan solved the "dilemma"15 by finding a way to 
unite the two extremes without compromising their underlying 
policies.16 The key to the solution is to recognize what the sixth 
amendment means by "witnesses against" a defendant: A 
"witness against" a defendant, he concluded, is a person who is 
serves serious consideration, because he writes from rich and seasoned experience in the 
law of criminal evidence. He argues that a person is a "witness against" the accused if 
his statements are necessary to enable the prosecution to survive a motion for judgment 
of acquittal. If a person is such a witness, the prosecution must produce him in person 
and tender him for effective cross-examination (absent, apparently, some narrow 
"excusing conditions"); if, on the other hand, a person is not such a witness, the prosecu-
tion may rely on his hearsay statements without producing him, leaving it presumably to 
the defendant to produce the declarant by means of compulsory process. 
Graham's proposal raises a number of questions. (1) It appears to relegate the right 
of confrontation to a minor role, because the prosecution almost always possesses enough 
"direct" testimony to survive a motion for acquittal. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S. 
Ct. 2781 (1979). (2) With persons who are not "witnesses against" the accused, but whom 
the prosecution voluntarily chooses to produce, it leaves the defendant in the peculiar 
position of having no constitutional right to cross-examine them. (3) With a person who 
is a "witness against" the accused (and whose out-of-court statements are, therefore, 
inadmissible without him), it subjects such evidence to a more rigorous standard of admis-
sibility than is ordinarily applicable under the due process clause to the state's other kinds 
of evidence (such as testimonial and real evidence) without explaining, however, why 
hearsay evidence should be tested by a higher standard. See Hearsay Rule, supra, at 1438. 
(4) It means that the prosecution bears a greater risk of unavailability for some witnesses 
whom the defendant wishes to examine (e.g., witnesses whose out-of-court statements are 
indispensable to the state's case) than for other witnesses whom the defendant wishes to 
examine (e.g., putative defense witnesses who appear to be in a position to negate or rebut 
the state's evidence), without explaining why the state should be a guarantor of the former 
when it is not of the latter. See United States v. Hart, 646 F.2d 798, 799 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(en bane) (prosecution is not a guarantor of the presence at trial of a government informer 
whom the defendant wishes to examine as a witness), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977). 
(6) It means that the defendant cannot assert his right of confrontation until the close of 
the state's case, because only then can the trial court determine whether the hearsay 
evidence is necessary to forl;!stall a motion for acquittal. 
12. Davenport, supra note 4, at 1381. 
13. John Wigmore asserted that the confrontation clause has nothing to say about 
the admissibility of hearsay evidence. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1397, at 131 (3d ed. 
1940). Justice John Harlan eventually embraced this view, but conceded that it is not 
"consistent" with the Court's controlling decisions. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 97 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Some commentators, too, have embraced that extreme 
position. See, e.g., Uncertain Standard, supra note 4, at 592-96. 
14. Justice Brennan appears to have taken the view that the confrontation clause 
forces exclusion of all hearsay if the witness is available. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 189 (1970) (Brennan, J ., dissenting). Some commentators have adopted similar views. 
See, e.g., Seidelson, supra note 4, at 91; Note, 31 VAND. L. REV. 682, 694-95 (1978); Note, 
Hearsay and Confrontation: Can The Criminal Defendant's Rights Be Preserved Under 
A Bifurcated Standard?, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 243 (1975). 
15. Note, 49 N.C. L. Rev. 788, 795 (1971). 
16. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179-83 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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available to give his incriminating evidence in the form of live 
testimony in open court, under oath, and subject to cross-
examination. Regarding "witnesses against" a defendant, the 
requirements of the confrontation clause are "extreme": the pros-
ecution is required (a) to produce the witness at trial, (b) to place 
him under oath, (c) to elicit his incriminating evidence in the 
form of direct testimony, and (d) to tender him for cross-
examination. In contrast, if the declarant is not available to be 
produced in person (and if the state is not at fault for his unavail-
ability), the declarant is not a "witness against" the defendant 
within the meaning of the confrontation clause. In that event, the 
sixth amendment has nothing at all to say about the admissibility 
of his out-of-court statements, and the prosecution is free to use 
the declarant's hearsay statements, provided, of course, that the 
statements are sufficiently reliable to satisfy the residual and 
minimal standards of due process.17 
In Justice Harlan's words, this solution makes the confronta-
tion clause a "preferential rule."18 It imposes a preference for live 
testimony in open court, under oath, and subject to cross-
examination. Barber v. Page19 is a good illustration. The Supreme 
Court in Barber prohibited the prosecution from introducing in-
criminating, prior recorded testimony, because the prosecution 
had not shown the witness to be unavailable to present the evi-
dence in the better form of live testimony at trial. Absent a show-
ing that a particular witness is unavailable, the confrontation 
clause obligates the prosecution to present its evidence in the 
preferred form of live testimony under oath and subject to cross-
examination. 
By the same token, however, the confrontation clause has 
nothing at all to say about the admissibility of hearsay state-
ments if hearsay is the best form in which the evidence still exists. 
That is so because it makes no sense to•discuss a preference for 
something that no longer exists. Since the confrontation clause 
operates as a preference for live testimony, the clause drops away 
as soon as the prosecution can show that live testimony is not 
available and that the state is not responsible for its absence. 
This does not mean that there are no constitutional limits on 
17. The due process clause requires, first, that the hearsay statement be sufficiently 
reliable to be rationally evaluated by the trier of fact and, second, that the hearsay 
statement together with the state's other incriminating evidence be sufficient to sustain 
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See 399 U.S. at 189 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
18. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
19. 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
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a prosecutor's authority to use the hearsay statements of unavail-
able witnesses. A prosecutor cannot obtain a valid conviction 
unless his evidence as a whole is sufficient to support a finding 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.20 Nor can he introduce any 
individual item of incriminating evidence that is too· unreliable 
to satisfy the residual standard of the due process clause.21 The 
latter standard, however, is a minimal one: only the most tenden-
tious and inherently dubious items of evidence are deemed to run 
afoul of the due process clause. In the Supreme Court's language, 
the due process clause bars evidence only if there is "'a very 
substantial likelihood' "22 that it is false. 
In sum, Justice Harlan found the confrontation clause to be 
both stricter and narrower than previously thought. It is stricter, 
because with respect to "witnesses against" a defendant - wit-
nesses who are available to testify in person - the clause is never 
satisfied with anything less than live testimony under oath and 
subject to cross-examination. Yet it is also narrower, because 
witnesses who are not available to testify against a defendant are 
not "witnesses against" him within the meaning of the sixth 
amendment. The confrontation clause does not purport to pro-
hibit the prosecution from using the hearsay statements of una-
vailable witnesses. If such a prohibition exists, it emanates from 
the general and more lenient commands of the due process clause. 
II. AN ILLUSTRATION: CALIFORNIA V. GREEN 
Justice Harlan's approach separates all hearsay cases into 
two constitutional categories, depending upon the availability of 
the declarant to testify in person. When witnesses are available, 
the state's obligations are defined by the strict requirements of 
confrontation: The confrontation clause requires the prosecution 
to produce the available witnesses whose incriminating state-
ments it wishes to introduce against the accused. On the other 
hand, when witnesses are unavailable, the state's obligations are 
defined by the more relaxed standards of due process: The due 
process clause permits the prosecution to introduce any item of 
incriminating evidence it wishes, unless the evidence is too unre-
liable for a jury to evaluate rationally. 
20. See Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
21. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
22. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.188, 198 (1972) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 
U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). See also text at notes 57-64 infra. 
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This distinction between available witnesses and unavailable 
ones - between confrontation and due process - can be illus-
trated by the facts of California v. Green.23 The prosecution in 
Green called a witness named Porter who had previously given 
incriminating evidence against the accused. When examined at 
trial, however, Porter proved to be uncooperative and claimed 
that he had forgotten the events he had discussed in his earlier 
out-of-court statements. ;Efaving failed to elicit the incriminating 
testimony from Porter at trial, the prosecution then introduced 
Porter's earlier statements. The statements came in two forms -
(a) a ·transcript of Porter's recorded and cross-examined testi-
mony at a preliminary hearing; and (b) a police officer's testi-
mony of oral statements that Porter had made shortly after his 
arrest. The defendant could not cross-examine Porter about ei-
ther of the statements at trial, because Porter continued to pro-
fess a loss of memory. 
Green, in Justice Harlan's view, presented two separate con-
stitutional questions. The first was whether the prosecution vio-
lated the defendant's right of confrontation by introducing Por-
ter's prior statements for their truth. The answer was "no." The 
confrontation clause did not bar the hearsay, because that was 
the only form in which the evidence still existed. The prosecution 
first called Porter as a witness and sought to elicit the statements 
from him directly; only later, when that effort failed, did the 
prosecution tum to Porter's earlier hearsay statements. Thus, the 
prosecution satisfied its obligation to attempt to introduce its 
evidence in the preferred form of live testimony. It resorted to 
hearsay only when the evidence turned out not to be available in 
any better form. 
For Justice Harlan, the second question in Green was 
whether the prosecution violated the defendant's right of due 
process by introducing the hearsay statement. Although the 
Green majority spoke in the language of confrontation, it used the 
same standards that Justice Harlan would have applied under 
the due process clause: The Court noted that hearsay statements 
are constitutionally admissible if introduced under circumstances 
that "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the 
truth of the- prior statement. "24 
Having identified the controlling standard, the Court then 
applied it to three sorts of prior statements, characterized by 
23. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
24. 399 U.S. at 161. 
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decreasing reliability: (1) recorded statements that are subjected 
to effective cross-examination when they are given; (2) out-of-
court statements that are not subjected to contemporaneous 
cross-examination but about which the declarant can be effec-
tively examined at trial; and (3) out-of-court statements that are 
neither subjected to contemporaneous cross-examination nor 
capable of being effectively examined at trial due to the declar-
ant's loss of memory. The Court held that the statements of type 
(1) are admissible because, even though pretrial cross-
examination is ordinarily "a less searching exploration into the 
merits of the case,"25 it "closely approximat[es]"26 the truth-
testing that would occur at trial. Similarly, statements of type (2) 
are admissible because, although contemporaneous cross-
examination would place the jury in a "better position to evaluate 
the truth of [a] statement," cross-examination at trial provides 
the jury with "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the 
prior statements. "27 For type (3), the Court remanded to the lower 
courts to determine whether a declarant's loss of memory de-
prives the trier of fact of "a satisfactory basis" for rationally 
"evaluating the truth of the prior statement,"28 a question that 
has since been answered in favor of admitting the statements. 29 
The significance of Green is not so much how it resolved the 
three questions of admissibility, but how it approached them. It 
did not ask whether the hearsay statements were exactly as reli-
able as live statements given in open court under oath and subject 
to cross-examination. Instead, having noted that the state's evi-
dence was not available in any "better"30 form, and that the 
absence of evidence in better form was "in no way the fault of the 
state, "31 the Court simply asked whether the hearsay statements 
were "adequate"32 for rational evaluation by the trier of fact. The 
latter is precisely the sort of question courts ask under the due 
process clause.33 
25. 399 U.S. at 166. 
26. 399 U.S. at 165. 
27. 399 U.S. at 160, 161. 
28. 399 U.S. at 161. 
29. On remand in Green, the California Supreme Court held the hearsay testimony 
of the police officer to be admissible despite the declarant's loss of memory. People v. 
Green, a Cal. 3d 981, 991, 479 P.2d 998, 1004, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500, cert. dismissed, 404 
U.S. 801 (1971). That is also the prevailing rule. See People v. Pepper, 568 P.2d 446, 
448-49 (Colo. 1977); Graham, Forgetful Witness, supra note 4, at 179-83. 
30. 399 U.S. at 160. 
31. 399 U.S. at 166. 
32. 399 U.S. at 168. 
33. In Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), for example, in deciding whether 
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III. THE SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
Justice Harlan's distinction between confrontation and due 
process is more than one man's view of the law. It finds multiple 
support in a variety of sources: (A) It corresponds to the practical 
distinction between excluding evidence when better evidence is 
available, and excluding evidence when nothing better exists; (B) 
its description of the confrontation clause as a preferential rule 
is supported by the jurisprudence of confrontation; (C) its defini-
tion of confrontation also corresponds to the standard that gov-
erns the state's parallel obligation under the compulsory process 
clause to produce "witnesses" in the defendant's "favor"; (D) its 
treatment of hearsay reliability as an issue for the due process 
clause is consistent with the jurisprudence of due process. 
A. A Practical Distinction 
Courts typically take a unitary approach to all hearsay prob-
lems, regardless of the prosecution's justification for resorting to 
hearsay. Justice Harlan's test divides hearsay cases into two sep-
arate categories, each governed by a distinct constitutional stan-
dard: cases in which the declarant is available, which are gov-
erned by a strict preference for live testimony; and cases in which 
the declarant is not available, which are governed by a more re-
laxed standard of exclusion. 
This distinction corresponds to the obvious difference be-
tween excluding evidence because it exists in a more reliable 
form, and excluding evidence even where it cannot be obtained 
in any other form. We are all willing to exclude even quite reliable 
information if we believe that still more reliable testimony can be 
had on the issue.34 Yet, at the same time, we are naturally willing 
to admit such evidence if nothing better exists. 35 This differential 
testimony concerning a single-photograph identification satisfied the due process clause, 
the Cour.t did not ask whether a photographic array or line-up would have been "better," 
432 U.S. at 117, but rather whether the identification based on a single-photograph dis-
play possessed sufficient "aspects of reliability" to be admitted into evidence, 432 U.S. 
at 112 .. See also text at notes 57-64 infra. 
34. The best evidence principle takes many forms, most notably the ancient principle 
that "a man must produce the best evidence that is available - second best will not do." 
See C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 229-30, at 559-60 (2d ed: 1972). Thus, McCormick 
quotes William Blackstone as stating that "the best evidence the nature of the case will 
admit of shall always be required, if possible to be had." Id. § 229, at 559. 
35. "[W]hen the choice is between evidence which is less than best and no evidence 
at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of doing without." Advisory 
Committee's Introductory Note on the Hearsay Problem, quoted in 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800-2 (1978). See also C. McCORMICK, supra note 34, at 559. 
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in evidentiary standards is reflected as a nonconstitutional stan-
dard in the best evidence rule36 and in other rules that condition 
the admissibility of hearsay on the declarant's availability.37 It 
should be no surprise that this same intuitive differential also 
operates on a constitutional level. 
Assume, for example, that a prosecutor offers rather reliable 
evidence consisting of recorded and cross-examined testimony 
from a previous hearing. If the declarant is available to testify at 
trial, one is intuitively inclined to reject the recorded hearsay in 
favor of live testimony.38 If, on the other hand, the declarant is 
out of the jurisdiction and unavailable as a witness, one is natu-
rally disposed to admit the earlier, fully cross-examined testi-
mony.39 
This differential in constitutional standards - Justice Har-
lan's distinction between confrontation and due process - is ap-
propriate because it reflects a shift in balances between the inter-
ests of the state and the interests of the defendant. The prosecu-
tion has an interest in trying the defendant with every bit of 
incriminating evidence at hand; the defendant, on the other 
hand, has an interest in excluding all but the most reliable in-
criminating evidence. Where a declarant is available to testify, 
the Court uses a strict preference that excludes his hearsay state-
ments. That protects the defendant without unduly prejudicing 
the prosecution, because the prosecution may still secure the very 
same evidence in the more reliable' form of live testimony. Where 
a declarant is unavailable to testify, the Court.uses a less de-
manding standard of exclusion. That still provides basic protec-
tion for the defendant, because it keeps out evidence that is too 
unreliable to be evaluated rationally by the trier of fact; yet it 
does not prevent the prosecution from using evidence at hand -
even if it is less reliable tlian live testimony - if it is the best 
evidence the prosecution can obtain.40 
36. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 34, at 559-60. 
37. See id. § 253, at 608-13. 
38. See, e.g., Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969) (prior recorded and cross-
examined testimony from a preliminary hearing is inadmissible so long as the declarant 
is available to testify in person): 
39. See, e.g., California v:Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970) (prior recorded and 
cross-examined testimony from a preliminary hearing is admissible, given the declarant's 
loss of memory). 
40. To be sure, a defendant cannot be convicted solely upon such evidence, Rather, 
in addition to such evidence, the state must present such additional evidence as is suffi-
cient, when combined with the other items, to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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B. The Jurisprudence of Confrontation 
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Green is remarkable 
in two respects. First, it reflects a profound analytical insight -
namely, that the state's use of hearsay evidence is subject to two 
different constitutional standards, depending upon the declar-
ant's availability to testify in person. Second, it recognizes that 
this analytical difference neatly coincides with the existing con-
ceptual distinction between confrontation and due process. In 
other words, the established law of confrontation corresponds to 
Justice Harlan's stricter standard of preference, wliile the law of 
due process corresponds to the.residual and more relaxed test of 
reliability. 
This view of the copfrontation clause - that witnesses 
against _a defendant are those witnesses who are available to 
testify in person - finds support in the Supreme Court's con-
frontation decisions. In cases where the Court has held hearsay 
evidence to violate the confrontation clause, the state either had 
not shown the declarants to be unavailable, or was itself at fault 
for their being unavailable. Thus, in Motes v. United States, 41 
the prosecution was prohibited from using the hearsay state-
ments of a witness who had disappeared, where it appeared that 
the state was responsible for his disappearance. In Pointer v. 
Texas, 42 . Douglas v. Alabama, 43 Barber v. Page,44 ·Bruton v. 
Unit_ed States, 45 and Russell v.' Roberts, 46 the Court rejected 
the hearsay statements Qf persons who, for all 'that appeared 
from the record, were availabie to give their evidence in the 
better form of live testimony under oath and subject to cross-
examination. Accordingly, these violations of confrontation can 
all be seen as resting on the prosecution's failure to introduce the 
"best evidence. " 47 
41. 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900). 
42. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Court in Pointer simply states that the declarant "had 
moved [to California] and did not intend to return to Texas" (380 U.S. at 401), without 
indicating whether his whereabouts were known or whether the state had used due dili-
gence to secure his attendance. It appears from the opinion of the state court below that 
the prosecution did know where the declarant was located in California and could have 
produced him if necessary. See Pointer v. State, 375 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. 1964). Justice 
Harlan so interpreted the case. See California v. Green, 399 U.S, 149, 186-87 n.20 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
43. 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
44. 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
45. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
46. 392 U.S. 293 (1968). 
47. It has been noted before that the confrontation clause has "overtones" of a 
"constitutional best evidence rule." Graham, supra note 11, at 143. Nonetheless, Justice 
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Similarly, where the Court has upheld hearsay evidence 
under the confrontation clause, the hearsay statements were not 
available in the better form of live testimony. Thus, in Mattox 
v. United States, 48 the Court upheld the use of a dying declaration 
made by a person who had since died. Similarly, the Court has 
permitted the use of prior recorded testimony where the defen-
dant had caused the declarant to leave the jurisdiction, 49 where 
the declarant had suffered a loss of memory by the time of trial, nu 
and where the declarant had permanently emigrated from the 
United States.51 In each case, the distinguishing element was 
Harlan's approach advocates a limited version of the best evidence principle: The confron-
tation clause, he says, requires the "best" evidence whenever the choice is between live 
testimony under oath and subject to cross-examination on the one hand, and other less 
reliable forms of evidence on the other. That is very different, and more limited, than 
saying that the confrontation clause always requires the "best" evidence, regardless of the 
various forms in which evidence is presented. It remains to be decided, for example, 
whether the confrontation clause continues to require the "best" evidence when live testi-
mony under oath and subject to cross-examination is not available, and when the choice, 
instead, is between two differing forms of hearsay evidence. The latter question was latent 
in California v. Green, 399·U.S.149 (1970), where the witness, Porter, was unable to testify 
to the events in question and where his hearsay statements were introduced in two differ-
ent forms - in the more reliable form of prior recorded testimony, and in the less reliable 
form of an oral statement to the police; however, having decided that Porter's hearsay 
statements could be introduced in some form under the confrontation clause, the Court 
did not have to decide whether the confrontation clause contained a preference for the 
evidence in the form of prior recorded testimony, because it remanded the case to the 
California Supreme Court to determine whether the oral statement was admissible. But 
see People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981,991,479 P.2d 998, 1004, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494,600 (holding 
the oral statement to be admissible although the same evidence had already been admit-
ted in the more reliable form of prior recorded testimony), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 
(1971). The confrontation clause can arguably be regarded as either a limited or a general 
version of the best evidence principle. Some courts take the latter view, holding that the 
state has a constitutional obligation to present real evidence at trial - and, therefore, to 
take steps to insure that it is available for trial - whenever its presence would enhance 
the reliability of direct testimony. See Blue v. State, 558 P .2d 636 (Alaska 1977); Lauder-
dale v. State, 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976). But see People v. Triplett, 68 Mich. App. 531, 
243 N.W.2d 665 (1976). The Supreme Court appears to lean the other way, holding that 
as between two forms of obtaining and preserving live testimony, the state has no constitu-
tional obligation to preserve - and, thus, to present - the testimony in the form that 
would make it more reliable. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), discussed in 
note 33 supra. 
48. 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892). Mattox was not actually decided on confrontation 
grounds at all, because it was the defendant, rather than the prosecution, who offered the 
dying declaration; but the Court has since treated Mattox in dictum as authority under 
the cm;ifrontation clause for the prosecution to use dying statements against the defen-
dant. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 
(1965); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 
275, 282 (1897); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895). 
49. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
50. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
51. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), discussed in Westen, Compulsory Pro-
cess II, 74 MICH. L. REV. 191, 286-89 (1975). 
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whether the hearsay statement was available in the better form 
of live testimony under oath. 52 
C. The Analogy to Compulsory Process 
The confrontation clause is one of two provisions in the sixth 
amendment that deal with the production of witnesses. Its com-
panion, the compulsory process clause, provides a defendant the 
right to have "compulsory process for producing witnesses in his 
favor." The two clauses are conceptual twins. They both assist . 
the accused in presenting a defense by enabling him to produce 
and examine witnesses on his behalf. 53 
Significantly, the compulsory process clause does not require 
a state to subpoena unavailable witnesses. Thus, a defendant has 
no right under the compulsory process clause to subpoena wit-
nesses who are dead, or undiscoverable, or beyond the territorial 
reach of the subpoena power.54 The state is not a "guarantor"55 
of their presence at trial. Rather, the most a defendant can de-
mand is that the state use the subpoena power to produce such 
defense witnesses as are still available to testify at the time of 
trial. 
The parallel here is obvious: Just as the state has no obliga-
tion under the compulsory process clause to produce witnesses 
who are unavailable to testify in person, so, too, it has no obliga-
tion under the confrontation clause to produce witnesses who are 
no longer available to give live testimony under oath. 56 
52. The only exception to this rule is Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), where a 
hearsay statement was held not to violate the confrontation clause, even though the 
declarant was apparently available to testify in person. For the argument that Dutton is 
nonetheless consistent with Justice Harlan's basic rule, see text accompanying notes 89-
95 infra. 
53. See generally Westen, supra note 5. 
54. See Westen, supra note 5, at 595; Westen, supra note 51, at 228 n.129. 
55. United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 799 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1120 (1977). Admittedly, the absence of evidence, though no fault of the state, 
could conceivably be so crushing to a defendant that a fair trial would be impossible. If 
the evidence is indeed unavailable for production at trial, and if the state is indeed not 
responsible for its unavailability, the defendant has no constitutional claims against the 
state under the "witness" clauses of the sixth amendment. Nonetheless, if the absence of 
the evidence truly precludes a fair trial, the defendant may have a residual claim under 
the due process clause. See Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376,381 (Alaska 1976) (absence 
of evidence, though not the fault of the state, denied the defendant a "fair trial" as a 
matter of "due process"); State v. Lewis, 137 N.J. Super. 167, 348 A.2d 225 (Law Div. 
1975) (the absence of "vital" evidence, though not due to the bad faith or negligence 
of the state, denied the defendant a fair trial under due process). 
56. There are, admittedly, some significant differences between the right of confron-
tation and the right of compulsory process, but they are differences that affect who has 
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D .- Jurisprudence of Due Process 
This brings us to the second of the two constitutional stan-
dards gov~rning the admissibility of the state's evidence in crimi-
nal cases. One of the advantages of Justice Harlan's theory is that 
just as the stricter standard coincides with the existing law of 
confrontation, so, too, 'the residual standard of reliability coin-
cides with well-developed notions of due process. The best exam-
ple is the line of cases on the admissibility of identification evi-
dence. Beginning with Stovall v. Denno51 and culminating most 
recently in Manson v. Brathwaite, 58 these cases all arise under the 
due process clause, and all involve the reliability of incriminating 
identification testimony. The problems of identification testi-
mony are remarkably similar to the problems of hearsay testi-
mony. Identification testimony is problematic because, while a 
witness can be effectively ,examined about whom he remembers 
seeing, the tenuous nature of his original observation (or the 
suggestive nature of a subsequent identification) makes it diffi-
cult to assess the truth of what he remembers. Hearsay testimony 
is problematic because, while a witness can be effectively exam-
ined about the words he heard, the absence of the declarant 
makes it impossible to assess the truth of what he heard. 
The Stovall-Manson line of cases is significant for two rea-
sons. First, it considers the same question as the hearsay cases: 
In both cases, the trjal court must decide whether certain incrimi-
nating statements, which are not available in any more trustwor-
the burden of initiating the production of witnesses, and when during the course of the 
trial the witnesses are examined for defensive testimony. They have no bearing on the 
scope of the state's duty to locate and produce witnesses. Once the appropriate party has 
taken the initiative, the scope of the state's duty to produce witnesses is the same, re-
gardless whether he is a witness whom the prosecution must produce on its own initiative 
(confrontation), or whether he is a witness whom the state must produce at the defend-
ant's request (compulsory process). It is entirely appropriate that the scope of the state's 
duty should be the same, because the essential purpose of each clause is the same: to 
assist the defendant in obtaining the presence of, and making available for examination, 
witnesses possessing evidence useful to the defense. So long as the state has no duty to 
produce unavajlable witnesses under the compulsory process clause, there is no reason to 
impose such a duty upon it under the confrontation clause. See Westen, supra note 5, at 
594-601. 
57. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
58. 432 U.S. 98 (1977). The cases fall into three categories: (1) cases in which the 
reliability of identification testimony is drawn into question because of the circumstances 
of the witness's original observation, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); (2) cases 
in which the reliability of identification testimony is drawn into question because of the 
supposedly suggestive nature of a prior identification, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 
U.S. 377 (1968); (3) cases in which the reliability of prior identification is drawn into 
question because of the suggestive nature of that very prior identification, e.g., Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
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thy form, are nonetheless sufficiently reliable to be admitted into 
evidence. Second, this line of c·ases confirms· that the· constitu-
tional standard of admissibility 1s a minimal one. Thus, in 
Simmons v. United States, 59 the 'court .did· not ask whether a 
photo identification is as reliable as a line-up .conducted in the 
presence of a lawyer; rather, it simply ask~d whether the use of 
photos was "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable ·misidentification."60 The 
same approach is followed in subsequent cases up to and includ-
ing Manson v. Brathwaite, all of which reflect a constitutional 
presumption in favor of admitting incriminating evidence and 
leaving its weight and credibility to the jury except in the most 
egregious cases. 61 
What does this mean for hearsay cases? It means that once 
a declarant has been shown to be unavailable, the inquiry no 
longer proceeds under the sixth amendment, but rather under the 
due process clause. And the due process standard is a minimal 
one. The question is not whether hearsay is as reliable as live 
testimony under oath, but rather whether it possesses (in the 
words of Dutton) sufficient "indicia of reliability"62 to justify 
"plac[ing]" it "before the jury."63 The question (in the words of 
59. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
60. 390 U.S. at 384. 
61. In the decade since Stovall was decided,, th~ C~urt ha~ · only once reversed a 
conviction on the ground that identification testimony. was too unreliable to satisfy the 
minimum standards of the due process clause, and then by a sharply divided court. Foster 
v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969) (holding 5 to 4 that a pretrial identification "so 
undermined the reliability of the eye witness identification as to violate due process"). A 
study of Stovall as applied in the lower courts has led.one commentator to conclude that 
identification testimony will not be deemed to violate due pr.ocess "except in outrageous 
situations." Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures - Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower 
Courts Bobble the Ball, 55 MINN. L. REv. 779,-818 (1971). In its most recent statement on 
the issue, the Court emphasized the wisdom of resolving doubts in favor of leaving evi-
dence to "the jury to weigh": 
Surely, we cannot say that under all the circumstances of this case there is "a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparaqle misidentification." Short of that point, 
such evidence is. for the jury to weigh. We are content to rely upon the good sense 
and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustwor-
thiness is custom(lry grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they 
cannot measure iI\telligently the weight of identification testimony that has some 
questionable feature. 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (citations omitted). 
62. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 8~ (1970) (plurality opinion). Significantly, this is 
the identical language the Court uses to describe the due process standards governing the 
reliability of identification testimony. See Neil v."Biggers,409 U.S. 188, 202 (1972) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring and dissenting) (!'indicia of reliability'-'), See also Manson v. Brath-
waite, 432 U.S. 98, 106, 112 (1977) ("aspects of reliability"). 
63. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion). Commentators have 
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Green) is whether the hearsay statement is such as to "afford the 
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating [its] truth."84 
Moreover, in making that determination, one proceeds under a 
presumption in favor of admitting evidence, trusting the jury to 
evaluate evidence for its appropriate weight and credibility, ex-
cept regarding the most tendentious and inherently dubious evi-
dence. 
E. Summary 
Under Justice Harlan's theory, the due process clause pro-
vides a baseline of minimum protection against unreliable evi-
dence: It prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence 
that is too unreliable to be rationally evaluated by the trier of 
fact. Above and beyond that, the confrontation clause provides 
additional protection when evidence exists in several forms of 
varying reliability, by requiring that the prosecution resort to the 
more reliable form wherever possible. Together, the two clauses 
ensure that a defendant will never be convicted on the basis of 
evidence that lacks miniIIJ.um indicia of reliability, and that 
where evidence exists in both written and oral form, the prosecu-
tion will present it in the better form of live testimony under oath 
and subject to cross-examination. 
The typical response to Justice Harlan's theory is that it does 
not sufficiently protect defendants, and that it departs too much 
from the "literal"85 requirements of the confrontation clause. The 
sixth amendment, so the argument goes, is strict and uncompro-
noted that the plurality's "indicia-of-reliability" test in Dutton is "interchangeable" with 
the standard applicable under the due process clause. See Note, The Burger Court and 
the Confrontation Clause: A Return To The Fair Trial Rule, 7 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & Paoc, 
136, 154 (1973) (emphasis added). 
64. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 191 (1970). 
65. It is commonly assumed that the "literal" meaning of the confrontation clause is 
clear, viz., that the prosecution must produce all persons whose incriminating statements 
it uses against the accused, regardless of whether such persons are available to testify. See 
C. McCORMICK, supra note 34, § 252, at 606 ("[T)he Clause, as it appears in the Sixth 
Amendment, in terms makes no provision for exceptions .... "); J. WEINSTEIN & M. 
BERGER, supra note 35, ~800[04], at 800-19 ("Taken literally this clause could mean that 
no evidence falling within a hearsay ex~eption may be admitted against the accused unless 
the declarant is available to testify .... "); Griswold, supra note 4, at 728 ("Our experience 
with the sixth amendment has taught us that it does not mean what it says"); 
Confrontation Guaranty, supra note 4, at' 860 ("[T]he confrontation clause is written as 
an absolute guaranty and, if interpreted literally, would exclude the use of all hearsay"); 
Comment, supra note 4, at 1167 ("A literal reading of the clause would exclude all hearsay 
evidence in criminal trials •... "); Note, 31 VANo. L. REv., supra note 14, at 685 ("Read 
literally, the clause imposes an absolute bar against the presentation of testimony by an 
out-of-court witness against a criminal defendant"). 
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mising: it requires that the "accused" shall be "confronted" with 
the "witnesses against him." Taken literally, this means that the 
prosecution must produce every declarant whose statements are 
introduced against the accused, regardless of whether the declar-
ant can be produced in person. Admittedly, it may be difficult 
to comply with the "literal" meaning of the clause; but, the argu-
ment continues, the courts should strive as much as possible to 
do so and should limit their departures from the strict require-
ment of confrontation to cases of "necessity. " 66 
The foregoing argument is fundamentally misconceived. It 
begs the very question at issue: It makes a threshold assumption 
about the meaning of the phrase "witnesses against him." It as-
sumes that by "witnesses against" the-accused, the sixth amend-
ment means all persons - whether available or not - who make 
statements that incriminate the accused. Yet that assumption 
not only begs the very question in dispute, it is textually implau-
sible. It gives the term "witnesses" an entirely different meaning 
in the confrontation clause than it has in the compulsory process 
clause. Remember, the confrontation clause is only one of two 
"witness" clauses in the sixth amendment. Just as the defendant 
has a right to be confronted with the "witnesses" against him, he 
has a correlative right to produce "witnesses" in his favor. Yet by 
"witnesses" in his favor, the sixth amendment does not mean all 
persons - whether available or not - who have made statements 
exculpating the accused, it means only those exculpatory wit-
nesses who are available to be produced in person, or who, if 
unavailable, are unavailable through fault of the state. 67 
What does all of this mean for the argument for a "literal" 
construction of the confrontation clause? It means that the ~rgu-
ment has everything backwards. The argument makes the un-
stated and unjustified assumption that "witnesses" against the 
accused includes persons who, through no fault of the state, are 
entirely unavailable to testify in person. Having made that as-
sumption, the argument then concludes that it is not practicable 
- and perhaps not even desirable - to give confrontation its 
literal meaning, though it remains something toward which to 
strive. In fact, it is much more reasonable to assume that "wit-
nesses" against the accused means the same thing as "witnesses" 
in his favor: persons who are still available to be produced in 
person. If that is what "witnesses" against the accused literally 
66. Note, 31 VAND. L. REv., supra note 14, at 694 n.71. 
67. See text at note 54 supra. 
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means, it then becomes both possible and natural to give the 
confrontation clause its "literal" meaning. In short, if the words 
of the confrontation clause cannot be taken literally, it is only 
because the words have been given an untenable meaning; if the 
words are sensibly understood, they can and should be taken 
literally. 
The standard riposte is also based on a second misconcep-
tion. It assumes that although the due process standard - the 
"indicia-of-reliability" test - is adequate for some kinds of pro-
secutorial evidence, it is .inadequate for hearsay evidence. The 
due process test is inadequate, so the argument goes, because it 
is insufficiently rigorous; it will admit evidence that, though per-
haps sufficiently "trustworthy" to be evaluated, rationally is not 
sufficiently reliable to protect defendants against false convic-
tion. To give defendants the evidentiary protection they need, a 
more rigorous test is required. 68 
The trouble with that argument is its failure to explain why 
hearsay evidence is categorically different from other kinds of 
prosecutorial evidence. Hearsay, after all, is not the only kind of 
evidence that can be c~allenged for lack of trustworthiness. 69 The 
same can occur with real evidence, eyewitness identification, 
and other kinds of testimonial evidence. Yet no one contends that 
the due process standard is inadequate for those kinds of evi-
dence; rather, such evidence is considered acceptable if it pos-
sesses sufficient "indicia of reliability" to be evaluated rationally 
by a jury for its appropriate weight. 
True, hearsay evidence has its own distinctive reasons for 
being problematic. But that is no justification for holding it to a 
different test of admissibility; at best it is an argument for taking 
its distinctive features into account in applying the test. The 
same is also true of eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness testimony 
68. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 109-10, especially text at n.11 (1970) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); Note, supra note 63. 
69. This is not to say that there is no room in the Constitution for a require-
ment of some measure of evidentiary reliability. But this requirement should be 
enforced through the due process clause, not the confrontation clause. • • • 
[H)earsay problems are not the only ones that arise in connection with criminal 
trial evidence. The potential for admitting worthless evidence is as broad as the 
range of facts that may be presented in a courtroom, either through testimonial or 
real proof. The confrontation clause, even if given the widest interpretation possible 
under Pointer, protects only against weaknesses in testimony that arise for want of 
cross-examination. Moreover, if there exists this basic and extensive concern with 
minimal reliability, it should not be confined to criminal cases as it would be under 
the confrontation clause. Only due process is pervasive enough to reach the evil. 
Hearsay Rule, supra note 11, at 1438. 
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is problematic for reasons of its own; but that is an argument not 
for rejecting the due process test of Stovall, but for applying it 
with discrimination. In short, if a particular item of hearsay evi-
dence possesses sufficient "indicia of reliability" to be evaluated 
rationally - that is, if it satisfies the test that governs every other 
kind of evidence - it should not be kept from the jury simply 
because it is hearsay. 
The best analogy here is to the constitutional standard gov-
erning the use of hearsay evidence in other stages of the criminal 
trial. The prosecution is not the only party who possesses an 
interest in offering hearsay evidence; the defendant, too, may 
wish to offer such evidence. When a defendant seeks to introduce 
hearsay evidence in the face of a state rule to the contrary, he 
must show that the evidence is sufficiently reliable by constitu-
tional standards to justify overriding state rules of evidence. Not 
surprisingly, in articulating the applicable tests, the Supreme 
Court speaks in the language of due process: the defendant, it 
says, must show that the evidence is introduced under circum-
stances that provide "considerable assurance of [its] reliabil-
ity."70 The analogy here is obvious: if the indicia-of-reliability 
standard is an adequate test of hearsay evidence when offered by 
the defendant in conflict with state rules of evidence, it should 
be adequate to test hearsay evidence when offered by the prosecu-
tion in accord with state rules of evidence. 71 
N. JUSTICE HARLAN'S SUBSEQUENT DOUBTS 
One stumbling block remains, one that has thus far pre-
vented Justice Harlan's opinion in Green from receiving the at-
. tention it deserves. The principal obstacle to a wider acceptance 
of Justice Harlan's approach72 is that he personally repudiated 
70. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973). See also 410 U.S. at 302 (the 
evidence must possess "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness"). While the declarant 
in Chambers was available to be cross-examined about the truth of his out-of-court state-
ment, the Court has since applied the Chambers rationale when the declarant was not 
available to be cross-examined. See Green v. Georgia, 99 S. Ct. 2150 (1979) (per curiam). 
71. The Court has implied that there is a reciprocal relationship between hearsay 
evidence that is sufficiently "reliable" to be offered in evidence against the accused and 
hearsay evidence that is sufficiently reliable to be constitutionally made admissible in his 
favor. See Green v. Georgia, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 2152 (1979) (per curiam) ("Perhaps most 
important, the State considered the [hearsay evidence] sufficiently reliable to use it 
against [a co-defendant], and to base a sentence of death upon it"). See Westen, supra 
note 5, at 627 n.167. 
72. Remarkably, many courts and commentators have adopted Justice Harlan's 
theory in Green despite his Dutton recantation. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thomas 
1204 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1185 
the theory shortly after announcing it. As he candidly confessed 
in Dutton v. Evans, 73 he became "convinced" that "the position" 
he took in Green was "wrong"74 because it would attribute to the 
confrontation clause "a task ·for which it is not suited."7G Before 
applying Justice Harlan's theory to Ohio v. Roberts, therefore, we 
must decide whether the theory can survive retraction by its au-
thor. 
Justice Harlan's specific objection to his position in Green 
was that it would impose an excessive burden of production on 
the state: That is, if the confrontation clause requires the state 
to produce all "witnesses against" a defendant, and if "witnesses 
against" a defendant include all available witnesses, then the 
confrontation clause would require the state to produce every 
hearsay declarant in person, even where producing the declarant 
would be "difficult, unavailing, or pointless."76 Yet "reasonable 
men"77 would have to agree that producing a declarant is so 
"inconvenient"78 to the state and such "small utility to a defen-
dant"79 that the prosecution should be allowed to use his out-of-
court statements without producing him. The examples that 
"come to mind"80 are business records and the common excep-
v. Cuyler, 548 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1977) ("We are constrained to adopt the view enunci-
ated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in California v. Green"); United States 
v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449, 454 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); People v. 
Pepper, 568 P.2d 446, 448-49 (Colo. 1977) ("Several courts have followed Justice Harlan's 
lead .... We adopt this view"). Also, a number of commentators have adopted Justice 
Harlan's view, either by wholly adopting it as their own or by making minor variations to 
it. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 4, at 554; Graham, Forgetful Witness, supra note 4, at 
183, 195-96; Note, supra note 15, at 795; Comment, supra note 4, at 1206-07. Professor 
Irving Younger makes an explicit plea for the adoption of Justice Harlan's view: 
[T)he Supreme Court has thus far failed to work out a coherent theory of the 
relationship between confrontation and hearsay ••.. A coherent theory •.. should 
afford the accused adequate protection against the possibility of conviction by 
affidavit or gossip and simultaneously preserve whatever logic and flexibility have 
been achieved over the centuries of development of the hearsay rule. With due 
diffidence, one suggests that Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Green is the 
place to begin. 
Younger, supra note 11, at 41-42 (emphasis added). For an original and penetrating 
precursor to Justice Harlan's theory, see Hearsay Rule, supra note 11. For the modifica-
tions that Baker and Michael Graham make to Justice Harlan's theory, see note 88 infra. 
73. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
74. 400 U.S. at 94, 95 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
75. 400 U.S. at 96. 
76. 400 U.S. at 96. 
77. 400 U.S. at 96. 
78. 400 U.S. at 96. 
79. 400 U.S. at 96. 
80. 400 U.S. at 96. 
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tions to the hearsay rule for "official statements, learned trea-
tises, and trade reports."81 Accordingly, Justice Harlan reasoned, 
unless the confrontation clause is to stand in the way of 
"enlightened development in the law of evidence, "82 it cannot 
truly be a strict rule of preference. 
Justice Harlan should be praised for his willingness to reex-
amine his previous opinions and for his candor in confessing error, 
qualities that distinguished his remarkable judicial craft. 83 In this 
case, however, his retraction was precipitous and resulted, I be-
lieve, from an understandable failure to recognize the interlock-
ing relationship between the confrontation clause and its sixth 
amendment companion, the compulsory process clause. At the 
time of Dutton and Green, the law of compulsory process was 
largely undeveloped, and its relationship to confrontation was 
virtually unexplored. In that light, Justice Harlan could under-
standably assume that the state's obligation (if any) to produce 
witnesses was entirely a matter of confrontation. Since then it has 
become more obvious that the confrontation and compulsory pro-
cess clauses both operate to enable the accused to produce wit-
nesses in his defense, and that the scope of the confrontation 
clause is largely defined by its relationship to compulsory process. 
The key to the relationship between confrontation and com-
pulsory process is the recognition that both enable a defendant 
to produce and examine witnesses in his defense. This point can 
be illustrated by example. Assume that as part of its case against 
an accused, the prosecution wishes to use the hearsay statement 
of a witness who is available to testify in person. The defendant 
in that event has two constitutional mechanisms by which he can 
examine the declarant about the truth of the hearsay statement. 
On the one hand, he can assert his right of confrontation by 
insisting that the prosecution (a) produce the declarant as part 
of its case, (b) elicit the statement from him directly, and (c) 
tender the witness for cross-examination. Alternatively, the de-
81. 400 U.S. at 96. 
82. 400 U.S. at 95. 
83. This was not the first time that Justice Harlan repudiated an earlier position. See 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 65 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring), in which Justice Harlan 
repudiated an earlier position he had taken in the same case (Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 
487 (1956)) that he "now" considered "not sound." This candor of Justice Harlan's in 
confessing an error impresses judges and scholars alike. See D. SHAPIRO, THE EvoLUTION 
OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN M. HARLAN 253 
(1969); Friendly, Mr. Justice Harlan, As Seen by a Friend and Judge of an Inferior Court, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 382, 384 n.9 (1971). 
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fendant can invoke his right of compulsory process, demanding 
that the government produce the declarant and make him avail-
able for direct examination as part of the defendant's case-in-
chief. In either event, each of the two "witness" clauses suffices 
by itself to enable the defendant to produce and examine the 
declarant for evidence in his defense.84 
To determine whether a particular declarant is someone 
whom the prosecution must produce as part of its case (confronta-
tion), or someone whom the accused is left to produce as part of 
his defense (compulsory process), one must understand why it 
makes a difference. One difference is that when the prosecution 
confronts a defendant with a witness, it relieves the defendant of 
the burden of identifying the witness and initiating his produc-
tion. Another more important difference is that when the prose-
cution confronts the defendant with a witness, it alters the order 
of proof by giving the defendant a right to cross-examine the 
declarant about the hearsay statement at a time when the state-
ment is fresh in the jury's mind (rather than forcing the defen-
dant to wait uritil he can call and examine the declarant as a 
witness for the defense).85 Significantly, however, both policies 
presuppose that the declarant is someone whom the defendant 
actually wishes to examine: both policies are entirely irrelevant 
otherwise. 
Now that we have identified the policies that determine 
whether a hearsay declarant should be produced by the mecha-
nism of confrontation (as opposed to that of compulsory process), 
we are in a position to formulate the distinction between a witness 
against a defendant and a witness in his favor, and thus the 
relationship between confrontation and compulsory process: 
(i) Witnesses Against Him: A witness "against" a defendant 
is any person who is available to testify in person (or who, if una-
vailable, is unavailable through fault of the state) whose state-
ments the prosecution introduces into evidence against the ac-
84. Although it is sometimes mistakenly assumed that the right of "compulsory 
process" is merely the right to enlist the aid of the state in securing the attendance of' 
witnesses for the defense, the Supreme Court has made it clear that it also includes the 
right of a defendant to place witnesses on the witness stand and examine them for evi-
dence in his favor. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See also Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-98 (1973), discussed in Westen, supra note 5, at 605-13, 
85. See Westen, Order of Proof: An Accused's Right to Control the Timing and 
Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 980-85 (1978). See also The 
Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 4, at 195. 
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cused and whom the prosecution can reasonably expect the defen-
dant to wish to cross-examine at that time. 86 
(ii) Witnesses In His Favor: A witness in a defendant's 
"favor" is any remaining person who is available to testify in per-
son (or who, if unavailable, is unavailable through fault of the 
state) whose statements the defendant wishes to introduce into 
evidence, including persons whom the defendant is not reasonably 
expected to wish to cross-examine at the time the prosecution 
presents its evidence. 87 
This distinction is consistent with Justice Harlan's perception in 
Green that the confrontation clause is a rule of preference; yet, 
at the same time, it also limits the preference in a way that is 
consistent with his subsequent misgivings in Dutton and with the 
policies underlying the distinction between confrontation and 
compulsory process.88 
86. The key word in this proposed rule is "reasonably," because it defines·when the 
burden of producing evidence shifts from the prosecution (i.e., confrontation) to the de-
fense (i.e., compulsory process). This bears emphasis, because it is a useful reminder that 
confrontation and compulsory process - both being obligations of the state to produce 
witnesses for the defense - are distinguished from one another solely by the party bearing 
the burden of initiating production of witnesses. The key to the distinction between them, 
therefore, as well as the key to the scope of each right, is the point at which the burden of 
producing witnesses shifts from the prosecution to the defendant. Absent more case law 
in this area, it is fair to assume that the burden shifts from the prosecution to the defen-
dant when a witness is no longer one whom the prosecution reasonably expects the de-
fendant to wish to examine. Theoretically, of course, one could alter the standard and, 
thus, either increase or decrease the scope of confrontation. Thus, one could require the 
prosecution to produce all available witnesses whose statements it uses against the ac-
cused, unless it is certain that the defendant does not wish to examine the witness. Alter-
natively, one could relieve the prosecution of the burden of producing such witnesses, 
unless it is certain that the defendant does wish to examine them. These variations shift 
the burden of coming forward with evidence; the purpose of adopting one variation or 
another depends upon the relative value of placing the burden on the prosecution (con-
frontation) as opposed to the defense (compulsory process). '· 
87. Assume that a declarant is not someone whom the defendant is reasonably ex-
pected to wish to examine and, therefore, is not a witness "against" the defendant within 
the meaning of the sixth amendment. The defendant nonetheless retains the right to 
produce and examine the declarant by the mechanism of compulsory process, provided, 
of course, that the witness is either available or, if unavailable, is unavailable through 
fault of the state. In most cases, however, it will be difficult (if not impossible) for a 
defendant to demonstrate that an unavailable witness whom the defendant could not have 
reasonably been expected to examine is unavailable through the fault of the state. The 
reason for this is that the very factors that would make it unreasonable for the prosecutor 
to believe that the defendant would wish to examine the declarant are in most case factors 
that relieve the prosecutor of any responsibility under the compulsory process clause to 
guarantee the availability of the declarant. 
88. Michael Graham and Baker each accept Justice Harlan's th!)ory, while making 
minor adjustments to accommodate Justice Harlan's subsequent misgivings in Dutton. 
Baker agrees that a "witness against" the accused means a person who is available to be 
produced in open court, but adds that the prosecution has no obligation to produce such 
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This distinction is also consistent with the Court's decision 
in Dutton. The trial court in Dutton admitted the incriminating 
statement of a declarant who had not been shown to be unavail-
able. Significantly, however, the plurality based its affirmance 
on the finding that it was "remote, " 89 perhaps even "incon-
ceivable, " 00 that the defendant would benefit from being able to 
cross-examine the declarant about the truth of his statement. 
If the plurality was correct in this finding, the prosecution's use 
of the hearsay statement in Dutton was similar to tlie "en-
lightened" practice of introducing business records and learned 
treatises without producing the declarant in person.91 Neither 
practice violates the confrontation clause, because if, in fact, 
the defendant does not wish to examine the declarant about the 
a person if his out-of-court statements are "mere[ly] routine and collateral." Baker, 
supra note 4, at 545. Graham, too, agrees that a "witness against" the accused means a 
witness who is available ,to be produced in person, but adds that the prosecution needs to 
produce such a person if his out-of-court statements were not "accusatory" at the time 
they were made. Graham, Forgetful Witness, supra note 4, at 192-98. 
Baker does not clearly define what he means by a "routine and collateral" out-of. 
court statement. If he means a statement about which a defendant could not conceivably 
desire to examine the declarant, his definition is probably too narrow to describe the 
kinds of hearsay statements that can be admitted despite the declarant's absence. See 
note 92 infra. On the other hand, if he means a statement about which a defendant could 
not reasonably be expected to wish'to examine the declarant, he makes a correct state-
ment but does not explain why it is correct: it reflects an appropriate balance between 
the obligation of the state to "come forward" with witnesses for the defense (confronta-
tion), and the right of the defendant to "come forward" with witnesses of his own (com-
pulsory process). 
Graham, too, is ambiguous about his term "accusatory." He says that a statement is 
accusatory if the declarant either knew or "could reasonably anticipate" that the state-
ment would assist the government in apprehending or prosecuting a person for a crime. 
But does the definition of "accusatory" then turn on the declarant's actual state of mind 
or on the incrimi.nating effect of his statement? If the definition turns on the declarnnt's 
actual state of mind, it then becomes necessary to produce the declarant and examine 
his "intent" in making the statement; yet the very purpose of the definition is to enable 
the court to decide whether or not the declarant is someone who should be produced. 
One also wonders why the declarant's state of mind should have any bearing on 
whether the defendant is allowed to examine him about the truth of his statements. Either 
the declarant's statement is such that the defendant could reasonably wish to examine 
him about it, in which event the defendant should be allowed to do so; or the statement 
is not one that the defendant could reasonably wish to challenge, in which event the 
prosecution should have no obligation to produce the declarant in person. In either event, 
the defendant's state of mind has no bearing on the constitutional obligations of the 
prosecution. The other possibility, of course, is to define "accusatory" not by the declar-
ant's intent, but by the incriminating effect of the statement. In that event, however, 
Graham's proposal collapses into the solution set forth in this Article and, if correct, is 
correct for those very same reasons. 
89. 400 U.S. at 89 (plurality opinion). 
90. 400 U.S. at 88 (plurality opinion). 
91. 400 U.S. at 95, 96 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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truth of his statements, no sixth amendment purpose is served by 
compelling the prosecution to produce the declarant; if, on the 
other hand, the defendant unexpectedly does wish to examine the 
declarant, he can always produce and examine the declarant by 
the mechanism of compulsory· process.92 
Dutton, then, was not a confrontation case after all. True, 
the declarant in Dutton was apparently available to give his evi-
dence in the form of live testimony under oath, and the prosecu-
tion ordinarily does have an obligation to produce the available 
witnesses whose statements it uses against the accused. But the 
prosecution has that obligation only. because it is ordinarily as-
sumed that the defendant would wish to examine the declarant 
about his out-of-court statement. If a defendant cannot reasona-
bly be expected to wish to examine the declarant - if it would 
be pointless to require the prosecution to produce the declarant 
on its own initiative - the prosecution has no obligation to do 
so. Instead, the burden of initiating the production of the witness 
shifts to the defendant, who retains the right to produce and 
examine the witness by the correlative mechanism of compulsory 
process. The defendant in Dutton could have .exercised the latter 
option, but chose not to. 93 
92. For a further elaboration of this thesis, see Westen, supra note 5, at 613-24. This 
explains why the prosecution need not produce the declarant in nonhearsay cases, where 
out-of-court statements are not being introduced for their truth. Since the prosecutor is 
not introducing such statements for their truth, he can reasonably conclude that the 
defendant would not wish to examine the declarant about them. See, e.g., Anderson v. 
United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219-20 (1974); Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 547 
(1926). If, unexpectedly, the defendant does wish to examine the declarant about his out-
of-court statement, the defendant is free to produce the declarant and the witness for the 
defense. 
This principle also explains the business-records cases. Cf. Dowdell v. United States, 
221 U.S. 325 (1911) (an appellate court, consistently with the confrontation clause, may 
take evidence consisting of a certified record of trial-court proceedings without producing 
the clerk of the court in person). The prosecution is not required to produce the author of 
business records, because ordinarily the prosecutor can reasonably assume that the defen-
dant would not wish to examine "the author of the records in person. See Griswold, supra 
note 4, at 726 (the business-records rule can be defended on the ground that it only shifts 
from the prosecution to the defense "the burden of going forward"). To be sure, some 
business records contain evaluative statements that the defendant can reasonably be 
expected to wish to examine; in that event, the confrontation clause would require the 
prosecution to produce the maker of the records in person. See State v. Monroe, 345 So. 
2d 1185 (La. 1977), noted in Confrontation Guaranty, supra note 4; Note, 43 Mo. L. REv. 
763 (1978). In each case, when a court passes upon the validity of a hearsay exception 
which allows the prosecutor to introduce a hearsay statement without regard to the availa-
bility of the declarant, it is not enough to ask whether the exception is generally valid on 
its face; rather, the court must determine whether the exception is valid as applied in the 
instant case. 
93. 400 U.S. at 88 n.19 (plurality opinion). Arguably, the declarant in Dutton was 
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In sum, Dutton was not a sixth amendment case at all, be-
cause it did not involve either of the state's two obligations under 
the sixth amendment to produce witnesses for the defense. The 
prosecution had no obligation under the confrontation clause to 
produce the declarant as part of its own case-in-chief, because the 
declarant was not someone whom the defendant could reasonably 
be expected to wish to examine; similarly, the state had no obli-
gation under the compulsory process clause to produce the declar-
ant for use in the defendant's case, because the defendant did not 
request that he be produced. Once the sixth amendment drops 
away, the only remaining question is whether the hearsay state-
ment in Dutton was too unreliable to satisfy the minimum stan-
dards of due process. The plurality implicitly answered the ques-
tion by finding that the statement possessed sufficient "indicia 
of reliability" to Justify "plac[ing]" it "before the jury ."94 Ulti-
mately, therefore, Dutton was purely a due process case,95 one 
that the Court implicitly resolved in accord with the presumption 
for admitting evidence and leaving its weight and credibility to 
the jury. 
V. THE THEORY .APPLIED: OHIO v. ROBERTS 
Ohio v. Roberts is a perfect illustration of why Justice Har-
lan's approach is so useful. Roberts presents a question that is 
difficult and perplexing under conventional confrontation theory, 
but becomes easy under Justice Harlan's approach. 
The facts in Roberts are simple. The defendant was charged 
with having received credit cards and other objects stolen from 
Bernard Isaacs. At his preliminary hearing, the defendant called 
Anita Isaacs, Bernard's daughter, as a witness in his behalf. She 
actually unavailable, because he was someone who could reasonably have been expected 
to assert his privilege against self-incrimination if called as a witness for the prosecution, 
See 400 U.S. at 102 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see 400 U.S. at 101 n.2 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). On the question whether the state has an obligation to make such wit-
nesses "available" by granting them use immunity, see Comment, supra note 4, at 1193-
206. See also Note, The Sixth Amendment Right To Have Use Immunity Granted To 
Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1266 (1978); Note, "The Public Has a Claim to Every 
Man's Evidence": The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 STAN, 
L. REV. 1211 (1978). If the declarant in Dutton was not available, Dutton could never have 
been a sixth amendment case, because the prosecution has no obligation to confront a 
defendant with unavailable witnesses and a defendant has no right to demand compulsory 
process for such witnesses. In that event, Dutton could have been identified as a due 
process case from the outset, whether or not the declarant was someone whom the defen-
dant could reasonably have been expected to wish to examine. 
94. 400 U.S. at 89 (plurality opinion). 
95. See note 63 supra. 
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testified that she had allowed the defendant and his girlfriend to 
use her apartment while she was away, but she denied ever hav-
ing given the defendant her father's credit cards. The defendant 
did not seek to cross-examine Anita Isaacs about the damaging 
portions of her testimony. As the trial approached,_ the prosecu-
tion discovered that she had disappeared from the ~tate and that 
despite its repeated efforts, ·she could not be. located. Unable to 
produce her in person, the prosecution offered a transcript of her 
prior recorded testimony. The trial. court a~mitted the hearsay 
evidence over the defendant's objection, and he was convicted. 
Subsequently he appealed, arguing that u,se of the .prior recorded 
testimony violated his sixth. amendm~nt rig;lit, of confrontation. 
It is not surprising that the state courts were divided in 
Roberts.96 The case is truly difficult to resolve.under conventional 
theories of confrontation. It is generi;tlly assumed that prior testi-
mony from a preliminary hearing that has been recorded and 
cross-examined may be used at trial without violating a defen-
dant's right of confrontation, presumably on the theory that the 
earlier cross-examination is substantially equivalent to cross-
examination at trial. Yet even that rule is difficult to square with 
conventional theory, because cross-examination at a preliminary 
hearing is not as "searching"97 as cross-examination at trial, and, 
even if it were, it comes to the trial jury in a· form that precludes 
the jury from evaluating the witness's demeanor.98 The problem 
becomes still more difficult when, as in Ro'berts, the defendant 
has an opportunity to cross:examine· at the preliminary hearing, 
but does not exercise it. One must then decide whether the 
opportunity for cross-examination should be considered ·substan-
tially equivalent to actual cross-examinat"ion·. Unfortunately, 
conventional theory provides no easy'answerto that question, nor 
does it even identify the standard by which an answer may be 
had. 
Justice Harlan cuts through these problems by making it 
unnecessary to answer them. The confrontation clause is not a 
"guarantor"99 of cross-examination (or of its substantial equiva-
96. The trial court, the Court of Common Pleas (Lake County), ruled that Anita 
Isaacs's prior recorded testimony was admissible under the confrontation clause. The Ohio 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that admission of the hearsay evidence violated the 
defendant's right of confrontation. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed by a divided vote 
of 4 to 3, over the written dissent of Justice Celebrezze. 
97. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970). 
98. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 198 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
99. See text at note 55 supra. 
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lent); it is a "preferential rule,"100 requiring the prosecution to 
make a "good-faith effort"101 to produce the witnesses whose 
statements it uses against the accused. The prosecution fully sat-
isfied that obligation in Roberts. It made a "good-faith effort" to 
produce Anita Isaacs in person, and was not responsible for her 
being unavailable. 102 When the prosecution then resorted to her 
prior recorded testimony, it did so because her statements were 
not available in any more reliable form. The prosecution had no 
obligation to produce her because, being unavailable to testify in 
person, she was not a "witness against" the defendant within the 
meaning of the confrontation clause. 
The real question in Roberts, therefore, is whether the prior 
recorded testimony was so inherently unreliable as to violate the 
due process clause. In the words of the plurality in Dutton, the 
question is whether the prior recorded testimony possessed suffi-
cient "indicia of reliability" 103 to justify "plac[ing]" it "before 
the jury."104 The answer involves two steps. The first step is to 
identify the "indicia" in Roberts that render the statement reli-
able. They are several: (1) The witness, Anita Isaacs, testified 
under oath; (2) she testified in the presence of a judge; (3) she 
testified in an open courtroom under the eyes of the public; (4) 
she testified in the defendant's presence; (5) she testified as a 
witness for the defense; (6) her testimony was transcribed verba-
tim so no mistake in transmission could occur; (7) she testified 
under circumstances in which she could have expected to have 
been cross-examined; and (8) the defendant allowed her testi-
mony to go largely unchallenged. 
The second step is to recognize the presumption in favor of 
admitting testimony and of leaving its weight and credibility to 
the jury. 105 This is particularly important here, because the issues 
100. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
101. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). 
102. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the prosecution had sustained its burden of 
showing that Anita Isaacs was unavailable to testify in person. She had left the state of 
Ohio, and her whereabouts were unknown; between November 1975 and February 1976, 
the trial court issued five subpoenas to Anita Isaacs at her parents' address; the last three 
subpoenas instructed her to" 'call before appearing' "; she never responded or gave notice 
of her whereabouts; her parents had not heard from her for over a year before the trial 
commenced. This should all be sufficient to satisfy the "good-faith" requirement of 
Barber. For an analysis of that standard, see Westen, supra note 51, at 276-98. 
103. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion). As previously noted, 
this is the same standard the Court uses when it decides cases explicitly under the due 
process clause. See note 63 supra. 
104. 400 U.S. at 89. 
105. For a description of this presumption, see note 61 supra. 
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the defendant wishes to raise regarding Anita Isaacs's testimony 
are ones that he could bring to the jury's attention at trial, and 
that the judge could comment upon in instructing the jury. Thus, 
consider the defendant's failure to challenge Anita Isaac's testi-
mony at the preliminary examination. His silence can be inter-
preted in two different ways - either that he could not challenge 
her testimony successfully, or that he chose not to challenge it for 
tactical reasons. If the former is true, the defendant suffers no 
detriment from his inability to cross-examine Anita Isaacs at 
trial. If the latter is the case, he remains free at trial to bring that 
consideration to the jury's attention so that it does not give the 
evidence undue weight. In other words, the problematic nature of 
evidence is not by itself sufficient reason for keeping it from the 
jury, because the very fact that it is problematic is something 
that a jury can take into account. 106 
Everything considered, the hearsay statements in Roberts 
were more than reliable enough to satisfy the minimum standards 
of due process. Perhaps the closest analogy is to the willingness 
of the courts to receive prior grand jury testimony into evidence 
when the witness is no longer available to testify at trial. Al-
though some courts disagree, the prevailing rule seems to be that 
grand jury testimony is admissible. 107 In allowing such evidence, 
the courts emphasize that statements are delivered under oath, 
are recorded, and are given in the presence of disinterested per-
sons. Obviously, if grand jury testimony is admissible, the testi-
mony in Roberts must be admissible, too, because the evidence 
in Roberts was given not in the secrecy of a grand jury chamber 
but in an open courtroom, in the presence of the defendant, and 
under circumstances in which the witness could have expected 
to have been cross-examined about them. 
A still better analogy is the line of Supreme Court cases that 
arose before the confrontation clause was made applicable to the 
states. These cases are directly on point because, having held the 
confrontation clause to be inapplicable, the Court was left to 
decide whether the hearsay statements were so "inherently un-
trustworthy"108 as to violate minimum standards of due process. 
The identical question arises in Roberts because once it appears 
106. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (plurality opinion) ("the statement 
.•. carried on its face a warning to the jury against giving the statement undue weight"). 
107. See United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1136-38 (4th Cir. 1978) (collecting 
authorities). 
108. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953). See also 346 U.S. at 194-96; West 
v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904). 
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that the rule of preference was complied with and the confronta-
tion clause thus satisfied, the Court will be left to decide whether 
the hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable to pass muster 
under the due process clause. Significantly, in its entire history, 
the Supreme Court has never once encountered a hearsay state-
ment that was so "inherently untrustworthy" as to violate due 
process. Perhaps it came the closest in Stein v. New York.109 The 
defendant in Stein was convicted on the basis of a hearsay state-
ment which his alleged accomplice had given the police after 
twelve hours of intensive custodial interrogation, interrogation 
that three members of the Court considered unconstitutionally 
coercive. Yet the Court found even that hearsay statement to be 
trustworthy.110 If the questionable evidence in Stein was reliable 
enough to clear the hurdle of due process, the evidence in Roberts 
clears it by a mile.111 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court cannot easily be rushed. If it feels it is 
still not ready to clarify the relationship between hearsay and 
confrontation, it will find a way to dispose of Roberts narrowly, 
perhaps on the ground that the defendant's direct examination 
of Anita Isaacs was comparable to the cross-examination in 
Green.112 If it takes that route, however, it will have added noth-
109. 346 U.S. 156 (1953). 
110. 346 U.S. at 194-96. 
111. See, e.g., Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1974) (prior recorded testimony 
that the defendant could have but did not cross-examine at the earlier trial is admissible 
against him at a subsequent trial if the declarant is unavailable to testify in person); 
Howard v. Sigler, 454 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1972) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972); 
People v. Allen, 56 Ill. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544 (1974) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 865 
(1974). 
112. The record shows that the defendant challenged Anita Issacs on only two of her 
responses - (1) that she did not give her father's credit cards to the defendant, and (2) 
that she did not want to purchase the defendant's television set (her motive, presumably, 
for giving him the credit cards). App. at 21. The challenges consisted altogether of three 
impeaching questions, questions which could not have required any more than 60 seconds 
to be asked and answered. When one considers that the defendant's entire defense at trial 
depended on his being able to discredit Anita Isaacs's testimony, and on his being able to 
show that she did give him her parent's credit cards and that she did it in payment for 
his color television set, one can hardly believe that his tender prodding at the preliminary 
hearing replaced the kind of cross-examination he would have conducted at trial. It did 
not serve the defendant's interest to explore the issue of motive in any detail at the 
preliminary hearing, because he could not make his version of Anita Isaacs's motive 
believable without himself taking the witness stand and testifying at the preliminary 
hearing, something he did not wish to do until trial. 
Nevertheless, even if the Court concludes that the direct examination at the prelimi-
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ing to the existing jurisprudence of confrontation, and will have 
decided the case on idiosyncratic facts that are unlikely ever to 
recur. 113 It also will have bypassed a valuable opportunity to 
break its ten-year silence and to resolve the "uncertainty,"114 
"anarchy,"115 and "confusion"116 that plagues this area of the law. 
These problems warrant the Court's attention, for they go to 
the core of the way criminal cases are tried. What are the prosecu-
tion's constitutional obligations regarding a witness who is avail-
able to give live testimony? Does the prosecution have an obliga-
tion to produce him in person before using his out-of-court state-
ments against the accused? What if a witness is not available and 
the state is not at fault for his being unavailable? Does the prose-
cution then have a right to resort to his out-of-court statements? 
nary hearing in Roberts was substantially equivalent to cross-examination at trial, the 
Court is still free to decide the case on the broader grounds of Justice Harlan's opinion in 
Green. The Court ordinarily decides constitutional cases on the narrowest ground possible 
because, ordinarily, the Court serves the judicial function best by deciding only what it 
must. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1935) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring). There are cases, however, in which proper performance of the Court's 
judicial function requires that it provide guidance through the prouncement of a general 
rule; in that event, the Court is justified - even advised - to depart from the Ashwander 
maxim, because the policies underlying the maxim are outweighed by the policy of provid-
ing general superintendence. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 
discussed in Kamisar, Book Review, 78 HARv. L. REV., 478, 481-82 (1964); Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), discussed in Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and the New 
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 384-91 (1964); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 153 (1803), discussed in Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 
69 DUKE L.J. 1 (1969). The most recent example of this practice of deciding a case on a 
broader ground than absolutely necessary is Arkansas v. Sanders, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979). 
Compare 99 S. Ct. at 2589 with 99 S. Ct. at 2594-95 (Burger, C.J., concurring). A more 
striking example from the area of confrontation is California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 153-
64 (1970), where the Court announced a general rule governing the use of prior statements 
of witnesse~ who are willing and able to testify about it at trial, even though the general 
issue was not presented by the particular facts of Green. See 399 U.S. at 192 n.5 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
113. Only in the rarest case does a venturesome defendant call his own witnesses at 
a preliminary hearing. Indeed, trial tacticians advise defendants never to do so: "Counsel 
should never present defense testimony at a preliminary examination unless there is the 
strongest likelihood that the defendant will be discharged after it is presented. This is a 
very rare case." A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE 
OF CRIMINAL CASES § 142, at 1-12 (3d ed. 1977) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). If a 
defendant does call witnesses of his own, he will "ordinarily" be limited to asking "non-
leading questions," because presiding magistrates allow defendants to cross-examine their 
own witnesses "only very infrequently." Id. § 141, at 1-131 to 1-132. 
114. Comment, supra note 4, at 1189. For criticism of the plurality opinion in Dutton 
and its confusing effect upon the law, see the authorities cited in note 4 supra. 
115. Davenport, supra note 4, at 1381. 
116. Baker, supra note 4, at 532. 
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What if a hearsay statement is admitted in the absence of a 
declarant? What is the constitutional standard for evaluating its 
admissibility? These questions are potentially present in every 
major criminal case. They have been simmering for over a de-
cade, and will persist until the Court provides the kind of consti-
tutional "guidance"117 it alone can supply. 
Sometimes, to be sure, the Court is able to bide its time in a 
neutral manner. In this case, however, its continued silence has 
a biased effect. Prosecutors, being reluctant to jeopardize valid 
convictions by making risky offers of proof, refrain from introduc-
ing even quite reliable hearsay evidence; 118 trial judges, being 
unable to obtain interlocutory rulings on such offers of proof (and 
being risk-averse), 119 exclude such evidence when offered, for fear 
of being reversed on appeal.120 Thus, the Court's continued silence 
engenders "uncertainty,"121 and uncertainty has the practical ef-
fect of skewing the law against the prosecution. The Court may 
choose to "avoi[d]"122 the issues presented in Roberts, but avoid-
117. "[T]he Court has as yet evolved no consistent theory which explains the result 
of its decisions and offers guidance to lower courts encountering fresh pro})lems." Graham, 
supra note 11, at 125 (emphasis added). Thus, some commentators have been saying for 
years that "[t]he time has come for the Court to articulate a theory which will provide 
clear and consistent guidelines for state courts and legislatures." Uncertain Standard, 
supra note 4, at 596 (emphasis added). Justices Marshall and Stewart have criticized the 
Court for leaving the lower courts to "struggl[e] with the problem of the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence not falling within one of the traditional exceptions to inadmissibility." 
McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936, 939 (1978) (Stewart & Marshall, J.J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added). See also Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 
439 U.S. 1014, 1019-20 (1978) (White & Blackmun, J.J., dissenting from denial of certi-
orari). 
118. In contrast to civil cases where trial rulings are often final, prosecutors realize 
that criminal defendants, if convicted, have easy and inexpensive access to courts where 
they may attack their convictions both on appeal and collaterally, and where evidentiary 
errors are unlikely to go undetected. 
119. Trial judges surely realize that if they err in favor of the defendant and he is 
acquitted by the trier of fact, the error will go unreviewed because the double jeopardy 
clause prohibits the prosecution from taking an appeal from an acquittal, while if they 
err in favor of the prosecution and he is convicted, an appeal will almost certainly follow. 
120. A good example is United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978). After 
noting that "at present" the law of confrontation is "unsettled," and that its "future path" 
is uncertain, the court of appeals reversed the trial court for admitting hearsay evidence, 
holding that in making its evidentiary rulings the trial court should have exercised its 
"discretion" in order "to avoid potential conflicts" with the right of"confrontation." 581 
F.2d at 350-51. Bailey illustrates the truth of the observation that this is an area in which 
"a precise rule is necessary," Natali, supra note 4, at 75, and where "the absence of clear 
standards [will] lead to relative anarchy" at the trial stage of the criminal process, 
Davenport, supra note 4, at 1381. 
121. See notes 4 & 114 supra. 
122. A. BtcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 169 (1962). For a criticism of the 
Court's policy of "conscious avoidance" in the area of confrontation, see Comment, 
supra note 4, at 1181. 
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ance takes its toll virtually every day a major criminal case is 
tried. 
